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The immense powers of the presidency and the vast array of global threats
demand a physically and mentally capable president. To help ensure able
presidential leadership, this report advocates reforms related to the 25th
Amendment, including proposals for an “other body” to act with the vice president
in certain circumstances to declare the president unable and a mechanism for
officials to report concerns about the president’s capacity. The report also
recommends new checks on the president’s authority to use nuclear weapons,
such as procedures for notifying top national security officials when use is
contemplated.
This report was researched and written during the 2018-2019 academic year by
students in Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution Clinic, which
is focused on developing non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the
nation’s institutions and its democracy. The clinic's reports are available
at law.fordham.edu/democracyreports.
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Protecting Against an Unable President

Executive Summary
The immense powers of the presidency and the vast array
of global threats facing the United States make it essential
to always have a president who is physically and mentally
capable of discharging the office’s responsibilities. The 25th
Amendment was designed to protect against the dangers of
an unable president. The amendment’s Section 4, which todate has not been invoked, sets forth the mechanism by which
the vice president and either the principal officers of executive
departments or an other body created by legislation can declare
a president unable to continue discharging the duties of his or
her office.
But the 25th Amendment does not necessarily shield the nation
from all harms that an unable president might cause. One of
the president’s most important responsibilities—the power to
deploy nuclear weapons—can be exercised unilaterally and
essentially at a moment’s notice. Current launch procedures
may not provide enough time for invocation of the 25th
Amendment.
Reforms are needed to help ensure that the 25th Amendment
can be invoked when necessary and to diminish the possibility
that an unable president may misuse the office’s nuclear
powers.
This report chronicles the history and text of the 25th
Amendment and describes recent legislation introduced by
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate for
establishing a Section 4 “other body” to conduct presidential
disability assessments as well as legislation to limit the
president’s nuclear authority. This report then makes four
proposals.
Proposal 1 recommends that Congress create a three-person
other body composed of the highest-ranking members
of the current president’s political party in the House of
Representatives and the Senate, as well as a third individual.
Suggestions for the third member of the other body include
a recently retired Supreme Court justice appointed by the

current president’s political party, the White House chief-ofstaff, and former presidents and vice presidents of the current
president’s political party. This other body would be established
by Congress if the vice president certifies that the president
has dismissed at least one-third of the principal officers of the
executive departments within 30 days.
Proposal 2 recommends an internal reporting mechanism
allowing certain high-ranking personnel from the Executive
Office of the President as well as other individuals, such as
the first lady and the White House physician, to anonymously
report observations of possible presidential disability to the
White House chief-of-staff and White House counsel. If, by
the joint assessment of the chief-of-staff and counsel, reports
of presidential disability are sufficiently corroborated, then the
counsel would have a duty to bring the matter to the attention
of the vice president, who is the indispensable actor in the
process of invoking the 25th Amendment’s Section 4.
Proposal 3 would require the Office of Legal Counsel to develop
procedures at the start of each presidential administration for
recording the votes of the participants in a presidential disability
determination, transmitting the declaration of presidential
disability to Congress, and for all other legal and technical
matters related to a Section 4 inability determination. After
developing these procedures, the Office of Legal Counsel would
be required to distribute the procedures to all participants in a
potential presidential disability assessment.
Finally, Proposal 4 recommends that Congress use its
appropriations power to require the Department of Defense to
consult with House and Senate leadership on a regular basis
about the nation’s nuclear weaponry program. Congress might
also require the Department of Defense to advise the vice
president and principal officers of executive departments who
serve on the National Security Council of any unanticipated
changes in the nation’s nuclear footing. Such notification could
lead those officials to invoke the 25th Amendment if an unable
president attempted to misuse his or her nuclear authorities.

Democracy Clinic
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Introduction
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in November
1963 was the eighth time that a president had died in
office.1 In addition to the presidents who had not survived
their tenures, others had suffered serious physical and
psychological ailments.2 Several of the prior presidential deaths
and disabilities had triggered discussion of the gaps in the
Constitution’s procedures for presidential succession, especially
the absence of a constitutional method for declaring a president
unable.3 But sufficient momentum for reform never built—until
the Kennedy assassination. Two months after the assassination,
Congress held hearings on presidential succession4 and, in a
year-and-a-half, the proposed 25th Amendment headed to the
states for ratification, which it received in February 1967.5
The nation had experienced the perils of presidential frailty
before, but the time in which the Kennedy assassination
occurred was different. It was the beginning of the nuclear age,
and the need to always have an able president was greater
than ever.6 With the Cold War as a backdrop, Congress acted
quickly to clarify and elaborate on the constitutional provisions
for presidential succession.7 The 25th Amendment included
procedures for removing an “unable” president from the
office’s powers and duties.8 A major purpose behind those
procedures was ensuring that a capable president was always
on guard to defend the nation from any threats it might face
and that a president who had lost his or her capacity could not
do any harm.9
1

See JARED COHEN, ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENTS: EIGHT MEN WHO CHANGED AMERICA xi
(2019).

2

See John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 918-22; see generally
Robert E. Gilbert, Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The
Difficulties Posed By Psychological Illness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 843 (2010).

3

JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 49-55 (3d ed. 2014).

4

See Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. (1964).
FEERICK, supra note 3, at 104-05.

5
6

See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in
Ensuring Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 964 (2010).

7

See id. at 963-64.

8

U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §§ 3-4.

9

See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 964.
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This report addresses one of the same challenges the 25th
Amendment’s framers confronted: protecting against the
dangers of an unable president. The 25th Amendment provides
the constitutional mechanism for separating a president from
his or her powers and duties when necessary. But, as this
report highlights, action is needed to plan for implementations
of the amendment. Additionally, there are some scenarios
where the amendment’s invocation might be impractical, such
as fast-moving emergencies or situations where the officials
empowered to invoke the amendment are hesitant to act. These
scenarios demand reevaluation of the policies that provide the
president with one of the office’s most consequential powers—
the unilateral authority to launch nuclear weapons. Accordingly,
in addition to advancing recommendations for the 25th
Amendment’s implementation, this report also recommends
reforms designed to prevent undue harm that might result from
the president’s nuclear powers.
Part I of this report discusses existing constitutional procedures
for scenarios where the president becomes unable and provides
an overview of relevant proposed legislation. Part II focuses on
the provision of the 25th Amendment that allows Congress to
create an “other body” to act with the vice president to declare
the president “unable.” This Part ultimately proposes a threeperson “other body” that would serve if a certain number of
principal officers of the executive departments are dismissed.
Part III proposes creating a reporting mechanism for Executive
Office of the President (“EOP”) personnel who have concerns
about the president’s capacity. Part III also clarifies procedural
aspects of the 25th Amendment and recommends that the
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) create procedures for recording
votes cast under Section 4 of the 25th Amendment to declare
the president unable, transmitting the disability determination
to Congress, and resolving legal and technical issues related to
Section 4. Finally, Part IV focuses on the president’s unfettered
power to deploy nuclear weapons and proposes that Congress
utilize budgetary powers to mandate closer coordination
with the Department of Defense with respect to the nuclear
arsenal. The final Part also recommends that Congress consider
requiring the defense secretary to notify the vice president and
other principal officers of the executive department who sit on
the National Security Council of any unanticipated changes in
the nation’s nuclear footing, in case use of the 25th Amendment
is needed to remove unable president before nuclear weapons
are deployed.

I. Procedures for an “Unable” President
This Part begins with a description of the 25th Amendment’s
provisions. It then discusses the meaning of presidential inability
and its relation to concerns over the president’s nuclear powers.
This Part concludes with an overview of recent proposed
legislation regarding the 25th Amendment’s other body
provision and the president’s authority to order nuclear launches.

A. The 25th Amendment
The 25th Amendment addresses what happens when the
president is unable to discharge the power and duties of his or
her office, in addition to clarifying the vice president’s status upon
succession to the presidency and creating a way to fill vacancies in
the vice presidency. The amendment is made up of four sections.
Section 1 states the vice president shall become president if
the president is removed from office, dies, or resigns.10 Some
interpretations of the Constitution’s original Succession Clause
had asserted that the vice president became president when he
acted in place of an unable president, permanently displacing
the president from the office.11 The prospect of preventing a
disabled president from returning from office, even if he recovered,
discouraged some vice presidents from acting in place of disabled
presidents.12 The 25th Amendment clarified that the vice
president only becomes presidents in cases where a president
permanently leaves office due to death, resignation, or removal.
Section 2 allows the president to nominate a vice president
when there is a vacancy in the office. The president’s nominee
must receive approval from majorities of both houses of
Congress.13 This section ensures that the 25th Amendment’s
inability procedures function as intended; without a vice
president, those procedures are essentially inoperable.
Section 3 permits the president to voluntarily transfer the
powers and duties of the presidency to the vice president
when he or she is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of the presidency.14 Section 4 creates a method for the vice
president, acting with either the principal officers of the
executive departments or an other body created by Congress,
to declare the president unable. The vice president serves as
acting president following such a declaration, but the president
can contest the determination, which might result in Congress
evaluating the president’s capacity.15
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1.
11

See Feerick, supra note 2, at 918-19.

B. Presidential Disability and Nuclear
Implications
A test for determining whether a president is “unable to
discharge the powers and duties” of his or her office was
intentionally left out of the 25th Amendment.16 Although
the amendment’s legislative record frequently references
physical and mental ailments,17 its inability procedures are not
dependent on a medical determination.18 But the amendment’s
framers did not intend it to be a means of ousting of an
unpopular president.19
Senator Birch Bayh, one of the principal architects of the 25th
Amendment, quoted President Dwight Eisenhower to explain
that “the determination of Presidential disability is really a
political question.”20 The 25th Amendment leaves that political
determination to the vice president and either “the principal
officers of the executive departments” or an “other body”
created by Congress.21
The debate around the adoption of the 25th Amendment
played out against a backdrop of nuclear anxiety.22 As the
discussions of an American Bar Association Conference on
Presidential Inability and Succession demonstrated, little
16 Jeffrey Rosen, The 25th Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political
Question, ATLANTIC, May 23, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/05/presidential-disability-is-a-political-question/527703/;
A Modern Father of Our Constitution: An Interview With Former Senator Birch
Bayh, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 802 (2010) (“So the question that I think you
have lurking throughout the document is, ‘What’s disability?’”).
17 When the 25th Amendment was being debated by Congress in 1965,
Senator Birch Bayh, the amendment’s sponsor in the Senate, said
Section 4 was intended for use when the president is “unable to make or
communicate his decisions as to his own competency.” 111 CONG. REC. 3282
(1965); Second Fordham University School of Law Clinic on Presidential
Succession, Fifty Years After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Recommendations
for Improving the Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 929
(2017). Representative Richard Poff said inability under Section 4 included
physical impairments that would inhibit the president’s ability to declare
himself unable as well as psychological impairments that prevented the
president from “mak[ing] any rational decision, including particularly the
decision to stand aside.” Id.
18

A Modern Father of Our Constitution, supra note 16, at 802.

19 John D. Feerick, Response to Akhil Reed Amar’s Address on Applications and
Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 41, 55 (2010)
(“At various times during the debate of 1964 and 1965, it was made clear
that unpopularity, incompetence, impeachable conduct, poor judgment,
and laziness do not constitute an ‘inability’ within the meaning of the
Amendment.”).
20 Birch Bayh, The White House Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, https://
www.nytimes.com/1995/04/08/opinion/the-white-house-safety-net.
html.

12 See id. at 919-20.

21 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.

13 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.

22 See Rebecca C. Lubot, “A Dr. Strangelove Situation”: Nuclear Anxiety,
Presidential Fallibility, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV.
1175 (2017).

14 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 3.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
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was perceived as possible to forestall the misuse of nuclear
weapons by an “insane” president.23 These nuclear fears were
illustrated during the Watergate scandal.24 As the possibility
of impeachment grew in 1974, President Richard Nixon was
drinking heavily and some officials viewed him as unstable.25
Around the same time, Nixon told reporters, “I can go back
into my office and pick up the telephone and in 25 minutes
70 million people will be dead.”26 In the days before Nixon’s
resignation, Defense Secretary James Schlesinger took the
constitutionally dubious step of ordering the military to
disregard orders from the president, including those pertaining
to the use of nuclear weapons, unless confirmed by him or
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.27

C. Recent Proposals
Recent legislative proposals have called for reforms related to
the 25th Amendment’s other body provision and the president’s
nuclear launch authority.

1. Oversight Commission on Presidential
Capacity Act
On April 6, 2017, Democratic Representative Jamie Raskin
of Maryland proposed the Oversight Commission on

23 JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
252 (1965) (“there is practically nothing that could be done to meet a
case where a President suddenly became insane and pulled the ‘nuclear
trigger.’”).
24 While named for the break-in into Democratic National Committee
headquarters by men associated with the reelection campaign of President
Nixon, Watergate has by metonymy come to refer to various illegal and
clandestine activities undertaken by the administration against political
opponents spurring congressional inquiry and eventually the resignation of
President Nixon to avoid impeachment.
25 See John A. Farrell, The Year Nixon Fell Apart, POLITICO MAG., Mar. 26, 2017,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/john-farrell-nixonbook-excerpt-214954; Robert D. McFadden, James R. Schlesinger, Willful
Aide to Three Presidents, Is Dead at 85, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2014, https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/us/politics/james-r-schlesinger-coldwar-hard-liner-dies-at-85.html.
26 Richard Rhodes, Absolute Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/03/23/books/review/thermonuclear-monarchy-byelaine-scarry.html.
27 McFadden, supra note 25.
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Presidential Capacity Act.28 This act proposed an elevenmember commission to serve as the other body under
the 25th Amendment’s Section 4. If directed by Congress,
the commission would carry out a medical examination of
the president to determine whether a disability exists. The
proposed commission would be composed of physicians and
psychiatrists appointed by the majority and minority leaders
of the House and Senate. Additionally, two members would be
former high-ranking officials, such as former presidents and
vice presidents.29 The Oversight Commission on Presidential
Capacity Act did not pass in the 115th Congress, but it received
media attention30 and 67 cosponsors.31

2. Legislation to Restrict First Use of Nuclear
Weapons
In January 2019, two proposals were introduced in the 116th
Congress to restrict the first use of nuclear weapons. The first of
these two bills was introduced by Representative Ted Lieu (DCA) and Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) and prohibits a first-use
nuclear strike absent authorization from Congress.32 This bill
received 57 cosponsors in the House33 and 13 cosponsors in the
Senate.34 Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Representative
Adam Smith (D-WA) similarly proposed legislation establishing
that the United States generally will not use nuclear weapons
first. This bill received 21 cosponsors in the House and four
cosponsors in the Senate.35
28 H.R. 1987, 115th Cong. (2017).
29 Other high-ranking officials include the Secretary of State, Attorney
General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, or Surgeon
General.
30 Ashley Killough, Dem Proposes Panel to Remove President if Unfit to Lead,
CNN (July 3, 2017, 7:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/30/politics/
jamie-raskin-bill-panel-remove-donald-trump/index.html.
31 All co-sponsors were Democrats. See H.R. 1987, 115th Cong. (2017).
32 All co-sponsors were Democrats or Independents other than
Representative Walter B. Jones, Jr (R-NC). See H.R. 669, 116th Cong.
(2019); S. 200, 116th Cong. (2019).
33 H.R. 669, 116th Cong. (2019).
34 S. 200, 116th Cong. (2019).
35 S. 272, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 921, 116th Cong. (2019).

II. The “Other Body” Under the 25th Amendment’s Section 4
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment sets forth a protocol for
transferring power from the president to the vice president in
situations in which the president is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his or her office but refuses to or cannot
voluntarily transfer power. Section 4 states:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority36 of either the
principal officers of the executive departments or of such
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume
the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.37
The 25th Amendment does not set forth who should serve on
the other body or the circumstances under which a Section
4 other body should be established. Nor does the 25th
Amendment specify when Congress should create an other
body. This omission allows Congress to wait to create an other
body until circumstances require it.
Our proposal for an other body seeks to preserve the dignity of
the presidency and to protect national security by minimizing a
power void that could incite domestic, social, or financial panic,
or incentivize opportunistic foreign aggression. The proposal
aims to provide precise guidelines for restoring certainty
and stability as quickly as possible in a situation where the
president’s capacity is called into question.
The framers of the 25th Amendment designated the principal
officers of the executive departments38 as the default panel
to work with the vice president to assess a president’s ability
to perform his or her duties. Although the language of this
36 In the April 1965 House of Representatives floor debates, Representative
Richard Poff (R-VA) proposed that an other body should be convened
if the principal officers of the executive departments are deadlocked
in their inability determination. There is no constitutional requirement
that Congress take any further action if there is a tie vote because a tie
vote means that there is no majority. There currently are 15 executive
department heads, making a 50-50 vote unlikely. However, a “tie” could
occur if (a) one or more principal officers is unavailable or abstains
from voting or (b) if the number of executive departments changes.
Representative Poff proposed that, if there is a tie among the executive
department heads, the other body should be all of the principal officer of
the executive departments plus one individual to cast a tie-breaking vote.
See 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965).

amendment does not specify under what circumstances an other
body should evaluate the president’s ability, the legislative history
makes clear that the other body is for when the principal officers
of the executive departments “for political reasons or otherwise,
becom[e] a roadblock” to assessing the president’s ability.39

Proposal 1: A Three-Person Other Body Should be
Created When the President Dismisses More Than
One-Third of the Principal Officers of the Executive
Departments
Congress should create an other body to make a presidential
disability determination with the vice president if, within
30 calendar days after principal officers of the executive
departments discuss invoking Section 4, the president
discharges more than one-third of them. A president might take
such an action to prevent the amendment’s invocation.
Given the vice president’s integral role in a presidential disability
assessment, he or she should have the responsibility of certifying
that the criteria for convening the other body are met. A vice
president may choose not to certify the existence of these
requisite conditions if the vice president believes the president
dismissed one-third or more of the principal officers for good
cause. For example, between July 19 and July 20, 1979, President
Jimmy Carter dismissed five Cabinet secretaries to “shake up” his
administration,40 not to block invocation of the 25th Amendment.
Once the vice president certifies the dismissal of one-third or
more of the principal officers within the relevant 30-day period,
Congress should act to create the other body to displace the
principal officers of the executive departments as the panel
for making presidential disability determinations.41 This other
body would exist until the president who, having formerly been
39 Birch Bayh, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Dealing with Presidential Disability,
30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437, 446 (1995).
40 See John Dickerson, What Happened When President Carter Fired Five
Cabinet Officials, SLATE (Aug. 2, 2017, 1:47 PM), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2017/08/whistlestop-on-carters-cabinet-purge.html; Cabinet
Officers in the Carter Administration, JIMMY CARTER PRESIDENTIAL LIBR., https://
www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/about_us/cabinet_officers.
41 In period before Congress took this action, the remaining principal officers
of the executive departments, and any of their successors appointed
pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2016),
would serve as the presidential disability review panel together with the
vice president.

37 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
38 The principal officers of the executive departments are often incorrectly
assumed to be the heads of every Cabinet-level official. The 15 executive
departments are set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 101. They are the departments of:
State, the Treasury, Defense, Justice, the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce,
Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development,
Transportation, Education, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security. 5
U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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declared disabled by the vice president and the other body,
reassumes the powers and duties of the presidency.42
The 25th Amendment states that the vice president must
act with a “majority” of the principal officers of the executive
departments and implies that the vice president should act with
a “majority” of the members of an other body if one is created.43
Therefore, it would be preferable for the other body to be
composed of an odd number of members.44 To ensure the other
body convenes quickly and acts effectively, we propose a threeperson45 other body. This other body should consist of: (1) the
highest-ranking member of the president’s political party in the
House of Representatives (presumably either the speaker of the
House or the minority leader); (2) the highest-ranking member
of the president’s political party in the Senate (presumably either
the president pro tempore or minority leader), and (3) another
member of the president’s political party selected by the vice
president and the other members of the other body.46
42 If the president transmits in writing to the president pro tempore of the
Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives that he or she is
no longer disabled, the vice president and the other body have four days
in which to declare that the president continues to be disabled. The other
body would be disbanded if the vice president and the other body do
not contest the president’s resumption of his or her presidential powers.
Retaining the other body as the disability determination panel throughout
the duration of a president’s inability is desirable because the members
of the panel would be familiar with the reasons for the initial presidential
disability determination.
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
44 The language of Section 4 of the 25th Amendment clearly states that the
vice president must act with a “majority” of the principal officers of the
executive departments. However, because of the manner in which Section
4 is punctuated, it is unclear whether the amendment also requires a
majority of the members of the other body to join with the vice president
for purposes of declaring a presidential inability. See John D. Feerick, The
25th Amendment: Its Crafting and Drafting Process, 2018-2019 CONLAWNOW
161, 172. Dean Feerick raises a question as to whether, because commas
setting off the other body provision were dropped without explanation from
the final text of the amendment, the “majority” requirement in Section 4
applies only to the principal officers of the executive departments. Id.
45 In its “Reader’s Guide” to the 25th Amendment, Yale Law School’s Rule of
Law Clinic notes that the dictionary meaning of the word “body” implies
that a body of persons consist of more than one individual and that this
interpretation of the word body is supported by the requirement that a
majority of the other body find a presidential disability in order to trigger
Section 4. See YALE LAW SCH. RULE OF LAW CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S GUIDE 17 (2018). We propose
that the other body be made up of three people. If the majority requirement
ultimately is held to apply to the other body, the other body should be
composed of an odd number of individuals so there is an affirmative
decision and votes do not fail simply because there is a tie. If the other
body is convened, the nation will likely be in a period of crisis and having a
small number of other body members would make it more likely to reach
a decision expeditiously. The other body should consist of more than one
individual and three is the smallest odd number greater than one.
46 If for any reason, the vice president and the two members of the other body
fail to agree upon a third member within 48 hours of first convening, the
other body could proceed by unanimous vote of the vice president and the
two other body members.
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The other body should be made up of members of the
president’s political party for two primary reasons. First, they
presumably have some loyalty to the president and are less
likely to improperly invoke Section 4 for partisan benefit.
Second, composing the other body of officials who share the
president’s political affiliation is in keeping with the selection
of the principal officers of the executive departments as the
primary evaluation group under the amendment.
Three possible third members of an other body include
the most recently retired Supreme Court justice who was
nominated by a president of the current president’s political
party, the White House chief-of-staff, or former presidents
or vice presidents of the current president’s political party.
A retired Supreme Court justice who was nominated by a
president of the current president’s party could be an ideal
other body member because he or she would likely be able to
make a non-partisan inability determination. Furthermore, a
retired justice would also understand the proper parameters for
invoking the 25th Amendment and the political implications of
an inability determination.
But there are drawbacks to involving members of the Court.
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger told the University of
Virginia’s Miller Center Commission on Presidential Disability
and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that sitting justices should
not be involved in a 25th Amendment inability determination
in case the Supreme Court was called to rule on an application
of the 25th Amendment.47 A retired justice would not be called
to rule an application of the 25th Amendment. However, even a
retired Supreme Court Justice might not be willing to participate
in a Section 4 inability determination because he or she may
feel that participation in an inability determination could
somehow bias the decision-making of the sitting Supreme
Court. A retired justice may also decline to vote on a disability
determination due to lack of regular contact with the current
president, which could be helpful to assess changes in the
president’s behavior.
The chief-of-staff presumably works with the president on
a daily basis and would thus be able to assess whether the
president was exhibiting signs of cognitive impairment.
Additionally, the chief-of-staff would most likely be a member
of the president’s political party and be loyal to the president.
However, because the chief-of-staff serves at the pleasure of
the president, a president who has already discharged one47 MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY
AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 9 (1988), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=twentyfifth_amendment_
reports.

third of the principal officers of the executive departments
who participated in an inability determination might well also
dismiss a chief-of-staff for the same reason.
Finally, former presidents and vice presidents of the current
president’s political party are strong candidates for an other
body because they are familiar with the demands of the
presidency as well as the political implications of making an
inability determination. However, a former president or vice
president may have little, if any, regular contact with the current
president. Additionally, former presidents and vice presidents
may not wish to risk their legacies by becoming involved in a
contentious matter.
The principal officers of the executive departments are part of
the same branch of government as the president. The framers
of the 25th Amendment included them in Section 4 to preserve
the separation of powers.48 However, if their ability to determine
presidential inability with the vice president is compromised, as
it would be if the president fired one-third or more of them, then
the involvement of other branches of government is necessary.
The advantage of having congressional leaders on the other
body is four-fold. First, if the issue at hand is a psychological
illness, congressional leaders would be as familiar with the
president’s personality and mannerisms as most principal
officers of the executive departments. This familiarity would
let them make personal observations about changes in the
president’s behavior. Second, congressional leaders would be
extremely sensitive to the political implications of a disability
determination. Third, if the president could not convince these
congressional leaders that he or she was able to perform the
duties of the office, then the chances of successfully appealing
his or her case to the entirety of Congress is low. Finally, the
other body must be created by Congress “by law.”49 Therefore,
any bill establishing this other body is subject to a presidential
veto, absent an override by Congress. A president is more
likely to sign a bill delegating authority to make a disability
determination to members of Congress from his or her
political party.
Even though Congress should not create an other body before
a presidential inability scenario arises, lawmakers should
develop a conception of what officials would be part of the
other body beforehand. It would be inauspicious for Congress
to spend time debating the composition of an other body when

a disability determination is needed. The legislative history of
Section 4 suggests that the amendment’s framers anticipated
that any legislation creating an other body would be enacted
when that other body was required to make an inability
determination.50 For example, in the Senate floor debates on
the 25th Amendment, Senator Bayh indicated that an other
body might be created where the vice president fails to obtain
a majority vote of the principal officers but still believes the
president is unfit to carry out his or her official duties.51 At such
a time, the president would be either unable or disinclined to
sign into law legislation creating an other body. Because it is
unlikely that the president would sign any such legislation, the
unsigned bill would not become law for ten days (excluding
Sundays) if the president did not affirmatively veto the bill
sooner, assuming Congress remained in session for the ten
days.52 More likely, the president would veto the legislation, and
Congress would then have to collectively override a presidential
veto with a two-thirds vote of each house of Congress.53 Given
the political controversy inherent in a presidential disability
determination, creating additional dissension would not serve
the best interests of the nation.
It might seem desirable to pass legislation setting forth who
would serve on an other body before the need arises. However,
having an other body in existence that will not make a disability
determination until a contingency occurs might lead to
confusion about the process of invoking the 25th Amendment.
Furthermore, allowing an other body to be created by Congress
at the time when a president’s ability is called into question
would allow Congress to make a definitive determination on the
composition of the other body. For example, former presidents
from the current president’s political party might be suitable
members of the other body; however, at the time of a disability
determination, there may not be individuals who are living, able,
and willing to serve in that capacity.
To preserve the dignity of the presidency and the safety and
prestige of the United States, it is essential that, if a president’s
fitness to lead is called into question, proceedings to evaluate
his or her ability be conducted respectfully and responsibly.
This proposal aligns with the intent of the 25th Amendment
and ensures the efficiency in what is likely to be a tense and
uncertain time.
50 111 CONG. REC. 15,384 (1965).
51 Id. at 15,383.

48 See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 987-88.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.

52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
53 Id.
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III. Section 4 Procedure and Reporting Mechanisms
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment makes the vice president
the indispensable participant in its procedure for removing
an “unable” president from the office’s powers and duties.54
Yet there is no publicly known process or mechanism to bring
concerns about a president being “unable to discharge the
duties of his office” to the vice president’s attention. It is also
unclear whether detailed procedures are in place for how
the vice president and the principal officers of the executive
departments or other body should utilize Section 4. Given the
provision’s complexity, guidance on how to properly use it is
essential. Further, the intense loyalty staff members feel toward
a president may prevent serious concerns about presidential
disability from being raised.55 With these realties in mind, the
proposals in this section aim to create a set of processes to
bring concerns about presidential disability to the attention
of the vice president and to resolve uncertainties related to
Section 4 procedures.
Proposal 2, the first proposal discussed in this section, would
create a reporting mechanism to allow specific personnel
from the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) to report
observations of possible presidential disability to the White
House chief-of-staff and White House counsel. If the chief-ofstaff and the counsel agree that reports of presidential disability
are sufficiently corroborated, then the counsel would have a
duty to bring the matter to the attention of the vice president.
Proposal 3 requires the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) to
develop procedures for recording the votes of the participants
in a presidential disability determination, transmitting the
declaration of presidential disability to Congress, and for any
other legal and technical matters related to Section 4. After
developing these procedures, the OLC would be required to
distribute the procedures to all of the constitutional participants
named in the 25th Amendment: the president, the vice
president, the principal officers of the executive departments
or other body, the speaker of House, and the president pro
tempore of the Senate.
54 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R45394, PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY UNDER THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR CONGRESS 8 (2018); Joel K.
Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power
of Reciprocal Relationships in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 195 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000).
55 MILLER CTR. COMM’N No. 4, supra note 47, at 8.

Proposal 2: Create a Reporting Mechanism for
Executive Office of the President Personnel
EOP personnel may play an important role in assessing
presidential disability because of their continuous interaction
and communication with the president.56 The EOP includes
many of the president’s closest advisers in matters of policy,
politics, and management.57 Thus, EOP personnel can directly
observe possible manifestations of presidential disability and
assess whether the president is “unable to discharge the duties
of his office.”58 However, concerns about job security and
intense loyalty to a president may hinder serious discussions
about president’s capacity.59
An internal reporting mechanism should be created to ensure
personal loyalty and job security concerns do not inhibit EOP
staff from raising serious concerns about a president’s ability
to discharge the office’s responsibilities.60 The reporting
mechanism should provide confidentiality and protection
from reprisal. The mechanism should allow personnel from
the EOP who have been designated either assistant to the
president, special assistant to the president, or deputy
assistant to the president to report observations of possible
presidential disability.61 Those reports should then be brought
to the attention of the chief-of-staff and White House counsel.
The reporting mechanism should also be open to select
persons who are not part of the EOP, or who do not possess
the above-listed designations but are in a unique position
to observe the manifestation of a disability, such as the first
lady and the White House physician.62 The chief-of-staff
and counsel should be tasked with jointly determining if the
disability report is sufficiently corroborated by other reports,
56 See id.; A Modern Father of Our Constitution, supra note 16, at 795.
57 See Executive Office of the President, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/
executive-office-of-the-president (last visited July 24, 2019).
58 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
59 See MILLER CTR. COMM’N No. 4, supra note 47, at 8.
60 JANE MAYER & DOYLE MCMANUS, LANDSLIDE: THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT viii-x
(1988). In 1987, concerns about President Reagan’s mental acuity were
uncovered when Jim Cannon, an aide to newly appointed Chief-of-Staff
Howard Baker, interviewed White House staffers in private and gave them
assurances of confidentiality. Id.
61 The three EOP designations specified in the proposal are representations
of staff rank within the EOP and do not necessarily correspond with a
staffer’s job title. Senior-level staff are designated assistant to the president,
second-level staff are designated deputy assistant to the president, and
third-level staff are designated as special assistant to the president.
See Martha Joynt Kumar, Assistants to the President at 18 Months: White
House Turnover Among the Highest Ranking Staff and Positions, WHITE HOUSE
TRANSITION PROJECT, at 4 (2018), http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.
org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Kumar_Assistants_to_the_President_
Turnover_10-02-2018.pdf.
62 See MILLER CTR. COMM’N No. 4, supra note 47, at 10-11.
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personal observations, or other information. If sufficiently
corroborated, the counsel should then have a duty to report the
matter to the vice president.63 The counsel and chief-of-staff
should also bring the matter to the attention of the president
if they reasonably believe that the president would consider
voluntarily transferring power by activating Section 3 of the
25th Amendment until the alleged disability has dissipated or
been resolved.64 After receiving a report of disability from the
counsel, the vice president may convene the principal officers
of the executive departments or other body to determine what
next steps should be taken.65
The reporting mechanism should not be open to persons who
will later vote to answer the question of whether the president
is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”
Because the vice president, principal officers of the executive
departments, or other body members will assess whether a
disability has rendered the president “unable,” special care
must be taken to maintain their objectivity and independent
judgment.66 In limiting the use of the reporting mechanism to
persons who are not a part of the line of succession, concerns
over “endless mischief” stemming from the actions of a
vice president or specific principal officers of the executive
departments or other body members would be partially
dispelled.67

At the start of each presidential administration, the OLC
should be charged with establishing procedures and clarifying
ambiguities related to all legal and technical aspects of
activating Section 4. Because the OLC is responsible for
providing opinions to the executive branch on constitutional
matters, it is already empowered to research and opine on
ambiguous and difficult questions of law related to Section 4.68
The OLC has established procedures to guide the conduct of
executive officials.69 Further, no one within the OLC is in the
line of succession, nor would anyone in the OLC participate in
a presidential disability determination. Therefore, OLC’s input
is unlikely to raise concerns relating to conflicts of interest or
political motivations of OLC attorneys. This last point may
be especially important in conveying a sense of procedural
legitimacy to the public in two key areas: recording the votes
of the Section 4 participants and transmitting a declaration of
presidential disability to Congress.70

Proposal 3: Requiring the Office of Legal Counsel
to Establish Procedures to Record the Votes of
Participating Constitutional Actors, Transmit the
Written Declaration of Disability to Congress, and
Resolve All Other Legal and Technical Matters
Related to Section 4.

The 25th Amendment’s text does not elaborate on how the vice
president and the “principal officers” or other body should cast
their votes on a potential presidential inability or transmit an
inability declaration to the president pro tempore of the Senate
and the speaker of the House.71 The OLC should draw on the
amendment’s legislative history and any other relevant legal
and practical considerations to develop detailed procedures.
Because of the unique circumstances that would surround a
Section 4 disability determination vote, it is unclear whether the
voting and transmittal procedures used by other executive or
legislative committees would be appropriate. Further, it would
likely undermine public confidence in the process of declaring
a president disabled if rules related to voting and transmittal
were determined in an ad hoc manner. Allowing the OLC to

63 It is important to note that Office of White House Counsel is not a
statutorily created or recognized entity and does not have any statutorily
defined duties. The White House counsel however, is constrained by
professional ethical obligations which require him or her to act in the
interest of the institution of the presidency, which may be different from the
interests of a sitting president. See generally Jeremy Rabkin, At the President’s
Side: the Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1993).

68 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2016). Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the president and
the principal officers of the executive departments may request written
opinions to questions of law from the attorney general. See Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-513
(2012)). The authority has been delegated to several entities since 1933
and the OLC was ultimately vested with this power in 1953. See Att’y Gen.
Order No. 9-53 (Apr. 3, 1953); see generally Foreword, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp., at
vii (2013) (documenting the organizational origins of OLC).

64 OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, CONTINGENCY PLANS—DEATH OR
DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 7 (Mar. 16, 1993), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/
twentyfifth_amendment_executive_materials/10 (stating that “a Section 3
transfer of authority is much more preferable to a Section 4 transfer”).

69 For example, during the Carter administration, the OLC “assumed a
singular, centralizing role in intelligence oversight. The Office ‘played
a major role’ in drafting President Carter’s executive order governing
intelligence activities. The order gave the Attorney General Griffin B.
Bell responsibility for oversight and regulation of executive intelligence
activities, and the OLC both served as his ‘principal legal adviser’ and also
had ‘primary responsibility for coordinating the drafting of the procedures
as well as for their effective implementation.’” Daphna Renan, The Law
Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 822 (2017).

65 The vice president may also decide to discuss the possibility of invoking
Section 3 of the 25th Amendment with the president.
66 A Modern Father of Our Constitution, supra note 16, at 795.
67 See MILLER CTR. COMM’N No. 4, supra note 47, at 10 (The Miller Commission
stated that “it makes good political and common sense to try to relieve
the Vice President the ambivalence that results from having to initiate the
process leading to his or her own self-promotion to the highest office in the
land.”); see NEALE, supra note 54, at 11.

70 After Watergate and other scandals of the 1970s, President Carter and
Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, relied in the institutions of formal legal
review at the OLC to rebuild public confidence. Renan, supra note 69, at 904.
71 See OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 64, at 126.
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develop procedures that specify how the votes of the Section
4 participants are to be recorded and how the declaration of
presidential disability is to be transmitted to Congress will
compel those participating in a Section 4 determination to
follow a pre-determined process. Once developed, the OLC
procedures should be reviewed and, if necessary, revised at the
beginning of each presidential administration.
There are some ambiguities in Section 4, most of which
can be clarified by referring to the amendment’s legislative
history and, where necessary, taking clear positions on issues
where there are conflicting statements in the legislative
history.72 For example, whether the vice president continues as
acting president during the four days after the president has
transmitted to Congress his or her written declaration that no
inability exists73 and what constitutes receipt of the president’s
written declaration to commence the 21-day period within
which Congress must decide on the president’s contested
disability.74 Given its responsibility to provide legal advice to the
executive branch on all constitutional questions, the OLC can
provide immediate clarity at the start of a new administration
and avoid some of the public uncertainty might develop during
Section 4 proceedings.
Some may assert that this proposal will exacerbate

72 Fred F. Fielding, An Eyewitness Account of Executive “Inability,” 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 823, 833 (2010).
73 See NEALE, supra note 54, at 14-15; OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 64, at 22.
74 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4; OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 64, at 21.
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opportunities for “endless mischief” by inserting individuals
who do not participate in a Section 4 determination into the
process of declaring a president disabled. History, however,
indicates that individuals who are not part of the Section
4 decision-making process have played significant roles in
matters related to presidential disability.75 This appears to
be especially true when administrations have undertaken
contingency planning.76
This proposal does not advocate for the OLC to implement
the mechanisms specified in Section 4. Instead, this proposal
calls for the OLC to clarify textual ambiguities and specify what
procedures should be followed if the mechanisms of Section
4 were activated. Once procedures related to the legal and
technical aspects of activating Section 4 have been established,
the OLC would be required to disseminate the procedures,
at a minimum, to all relevant constitutional actors, the White
House chief-of-staff, and other high-level EOP staff. The OLC’s
clarification and procedures will, therefore, make it more
difficult for any actor to create “mischief” under Section 4.
75 See Fielding, supra note 72, at 830. In 1985, White House Counsel Fred
Fielding convinced President Reagan to follow the procedures of Section
3 of the 25th Amendment before he underwent cancer surgery. After the
surgery, Fielding, the chief-of-staff, and the press secretary decided to
test whether Reagan was lucid enough to resume the powers of his office
by having him read a letter. In responding to criticisms that Fielding, as a
non-constitutional actor, inappropriately inserted himself into the process,
Fielding has said “presidential declaration that he or she is fit . . . will never,
in any real sense, stand alone . . . the role of any presidential adviser, on
this or other issues, is to evaluate the circumstances for the President and
provide your judgment and your recommendation to the President.” Id. at
830-32.
76 Id.; see generally NEALE, supra note 54.

IV. The President’s Nuclear Authority
Section 4 of the 25th Amendment sought to address the
fundamental question of how to prevent an unable president
from exercising the most critical powers of the office—including
the authority to launch nuclear weapons. During the Cold
War, the president’s power to act in emergencies or to repel
invasion77 was deemed superior to congressional authority
to select warfare prerogatives.78 However, a rebalancing is
now warranted. As the Arms Control Association79 warned in
2017, “Continuing to vest such destructive power in the hands
of one person is undemocratic, irresponsible, unnecessary
and increasingly untenable.”80 This Part evaluates a series of
proposals over the past 40 years for constraining presidential
authority to utilize nuclear weapons in particular circumstances.
These proposals may sufficiently elongate launch processes to
enable triggering constitutional protections, including the 25th
Amendment, in cases of presidential instability. However, each
proposal presents unresolved constitutional questions regarding
the division of war powers that undermine their capacity to
structurally reform present procedures. This Part, therefore,
proposes Congress leverage its spending power to (1) require
more close consultation between the Department of Defense
and congressional leadership and (2) ensure the vice president
and the principal officers of the executive departments on the
National Security Council are kept apprised of any unanticipated
changes in the nation’s nuclear footing for scenarios where
invocation of the 25th Amendment may be needed.

A. Nuclear Launch Procedures
While specific nuclear launch procedures are highly-classified,81
the basic contours for presidential authorization of a nuclear
launch are well-known. When the president decides to consider
launching a nuclear strike, whether preemptive or in response
77 See Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
78 Richard K. Betts & Matthew C. Waxman, The President and the Bomb, 97
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 119, 127 (2018) (“In the past, the enormous stakes of nuclear
decision-making were used to justify expanded presidential powers,
but today, the better argument is that the special challenges of nuclear
decisions justify giving Congress some authority to regulate them.”).
79 A nonpartisan membership organization founded in 1971, with the selfstated mission of “promoting public understanding of and support for
effective arms control policies.”
80 Daryl G. Kimball & Kingston Reif, Time To Revise Nuclear Launch Policy,
HILL (Nov. 13, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/
foreign-policy/360055-time-to-revise-nuclear-launch-policy; see also
Editorial: No One Should Have Sole Authority to Launch a Nuclear Attack, SCI.
AMERICAN, Aug. 1, 2017, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/noone-should-have-sole-authority-to-launch-a-nuclear-attack/.
81 See Joseph Trevichik, Here’s America’s Plan for Nuking its Enemies, Including
North Korea, DRIVE, Apr. 17, 2017, http://www.thedrive.com/the-warzone/9056/heres-americas-plan-for-nuking-its-enemies-including-northkorea (analyzing a redacted copy of present nuclear plans).

to an impending or successful attack against U.S. assets, he
or she confers with senior military and civilian leadership.82
If initiated in response to an imminent or successful attack,
such consultation may last mere minutes.83 If the president
determines to proceed, he or she will authenticate the order
using the “biscuit,” a laminated card with challenge code
responses kept in the “nuclear football.”84 Once confirmed, the
orders are transmitted to launch crews around the world who
authenticate the order and prepare the missiles for launch.85
This process takes as few as five minutes for land-based
ordinance and 15 for launches from submarines.86
The requirement for final authentication by the launch crews is
meant to assure the legality of any order by including principles
of “military necessity, distinction and proportionality.”87
However, questions persist regarding whether the present
procedure is sufficiently cumbersome to preclude imprudent
launches88 and whether relying on ad hoc disobedience, which
is “both unreliable and fraught with constitutional and policy
implications,” is the appropriate solution.89

B. War Powers
Congress’s ability to curtail the president’s authority to utilize
nuclear weapons, whether in particular circumstances or
pursuant to particular procedures, is predicated upon a
contested interpretation of the president’s war powers. The
president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.90
However, Congress possesses the authority to declare war and
“make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces.”91 Congress has repeatedly utilized these powers
to define many aspects of the military, including size and
82 Bruce Blair, Strengthening Checks on Presidential Nuclear Launch Authority,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2018, at 7-8.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 8; Michael Dobbs, The Real Story of the “Football” That Follows
the President Everywhere, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Oct. 2014, https://www.
smithsonianmag.com/history/real-story-football-follows-presidenteverywhere-180952779/. The nuclear football is carried by a military aide
who accompanies the president at all times. Id.
85 Blair, supra note 82, at 8.
86 Id.
87 See Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of General C.
Robert Kehler).
88 Betts & Waxman, supra note 78, at 120 (“[A]lthough common sense and
careful official planning dictate a process to prevent an imprudent and
impulsive president from starting a nuclear war, there is nothing stopping a
determined president from overriding it.”).
89 Id. at 122.
90 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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armaments.92 In 1973, over the veto of President Nixon, Congress
adopted the War Powers Resolution, curtailing the executive
branch’s authority to commit forces to armed conflict absent
congressional authorization or certain exigent circumstances.93
In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report approving
the bill, Chairman J. William Fulbright wrote, “I concur wholly
. . . that Congress must retain control over the conventional or
nuclear character of a war.”94 Fulbright subsequently offered an
amendment to the legislation providing that, except in a declared
war or “in response to a nuclear attack or irrevocable launch of
nuclear weapons, the President may not use nuclear weapons
without the prior, explicit authorization of the Congress.”95 The
majority of the debate on the amendment addressed whether
the resolution was the appropriate venue for resolving concerns
over nuclear powers,96 though some senators also expressed
concern over the provision’s constitutionality.97 The amendment
was defeated 68-10.98 Since then, some have argued that
Congress has explicitly99 or through inaction100 condoned
unilateral presidential power in the nuclear arena, though any
such delegations would be revocable.

approval is the absence of consensus regarding whether nuclear
weapons are improperly classified as conventional weapons. For
example, many concur with President Truman’s assertion that a
nuclear weapon “isn’t a military weapon. It is used to wipe out
women and children and unarmed people, and not for military
uses. So we have got to treat [nuclear weapons] differently
from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that.”101 Others,
such as Senator Barry Goldwater, advocate for arming infantrymen with tactical nuclear weapons under the belief that they
are conventional weapons.102

C. Prior Proposals

One factor in the continued debate over inherent presidential
authority to utilize nuclear weaponry without congressional

Proposals to amend nuclear launch authority have fallen into
three categories: consultation, approval, and prohibition. In
1975, the first major proposal after the unsuccessful Fulbright
amendment was offered by the Federation of American
Scientists (“FAS”). The FAS proposed that in all conflicts,
with no exceptions, “so long as no nuclear weapons (or other
weapons of mass destruction103) have been used by others, the
President shall not use nuclear weapons without consulting
with, and securing the assent of a majority of, a committee”104
of Congress.105 The proposal received significant attention

92 See A General Military Law, 10 U.S.C. subtit. A (governing procurement,
organization, powers and personnel); Chemical and Biological Warfare
Program, 50 U.S.C. ch. 32 (regulating chemical and biological warfare
program).

101 See ROBERT H. FERRELL, HARRY S. TRUMAN: A LIFE 344 (1994); see also Yonkel
Goldstein, Note, The Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the
Nuclear Age: The Argument for a Constitutional Amendment, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1543, 1577 (1988).

93 War Powers Resolution, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548).

102 Nation: The Fear and the Facts, TIME, Sept. 25, 1964. Such a distinction has
been dismissed by former Defense Secretary James Mattis. Aaron Mehta,
Mattis: No Such Thing as a ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapon, But New Cruise Missile
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any circumstances[.]”).
97 Id. at 12,451 (statement of Sen. Javits) (“I have deep concern, and I am not
trying to conclude the question, as to whether the President of the United
States with his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief can be
prevented from using a nuclear weapon in our arsenal in defense of the
United States or in defense of the Armed Forces of the United States.”);
id. at 12,454 (statement of Sen. Cooper) (“I do not think that writing this
language into a statute can in any way limit the constitutional authority of
the President to use nuclear weapons if he thought it necessary to protect
the existence of our country. We cannot by statute deny the constitutional
power of the President.”).
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103 No treaty or customary international law provides an authoritative definition
for weapons of mass destructions, but the Department of Defense define
them as “[c]hemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable
of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties, and excluding
the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means
is a separable and divisible part from the weapon.” DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 232 (2019), https://www.jcs.
mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.
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and review over the subsequent decades.106 However, it was
criticized based on its limited scope, concerns about difficulties
defining “covered launches,”107 and debates over whether it
constituted a legislative veto prohibited by INS v. Chadha.108
Noted constitutional law professor and commentator, Arthur
S. Miller, rejected the FAS proposal and instead advocated for
reviving legislative proposals requiring the president to consult
with a congressionally created “Council of State.”109 Other
proposals call for constitutional amendments to resolve the
underlying war powers controversy.110
In recent years, three approaches have been identified as
potential methods for checking presidential action in the
nuclear arena. First, congressional action could prohibit the first
use of nuclear weapons. Two bills prohibiting such first use have
been introduced in the 116th Congress.111 The first bill discusses
presidential war powers,112 while the latter bill contains only one
sentence that states, “It is the policy of the United States to not
106 See generally FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHO
DECIDES? (Peter Raven-Hansen ed., 1987).
107 Goldstein, Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the Nuclear
Age, supra note 101, at 1583.
108 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (finding one house legislative veto violated separation
of powers). Proponents of FAS proposal distinguished it as not revoking
executive authority but extending it and argued that Chadha did not
apply in the foreign policy arena where powers were shared. Allan Ides,
Congressional Authority to Regulate the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 233 (1985); William C. Banks, First Use of Nuclear Weapons:
The Constitutional Role of a Congressional Leadership Committee, 13 J. LEGIS. 1
(1986); see also Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 673 F.2d 425, 459 (D.C Cir. 1982), aff’d mem sub nom. Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumers Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S 1216
(1983) (“[T]he foreign affairs veto presents unique problems since in that
context there is the additional question whether Congress or the President
or both have the inherent power to act.”).
109 See Arthur S. Miller & H. Bart Cox, Congress, the Constitution, and First Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 48 REV. OF POL. 424 (1986).
110 Goldstein, Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the Nuclear
Age, supra note 101, at 1544 (“The proposed amendment would both (1)
clearly establish congressional authority to set policy in all matters relating
to the preparation and execution of war, hostilities, aggression, or defense
of the United States, American citizens, and American interests, and (2)
establish a private right of action against Congress for its failure to make
diligent efforts to ascertain the relevant facts, to debate, and to set policy
in this area.”); see also Ray Forrester, Presidential Wars in the Nuclear Age: An
Unresolved Problem, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1636, 1639 (1989).
111 Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2019, H.R. 669/S. 200,
116th Cong. (2019). Some contend that “whether Congress likes it or not, it
must be involved in any [] decision” to order first use of nuclear weapons
since “it is [otherwise] unconstitutional, in the absence of a declaration of
war.” Jeremy Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlawful, 56 FOREIGN POL’Y 94,
95 (1984). Peter Raven-Hansen argues that the non-delegation doctrine
requires Congress to make the choice of first-use policy but “cannot make
it in advance of the event because that would give the President a blank
check to declare war.” Raven-Hansen, supra note 100, at 791.
112 Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act of 2019, H.R. 669, 116th
Cong. (2019).

use nuclear weapons first.”113 This approach has received some
criticism, including from Bruce Blair, who cites the potential
of inextricably tying the president’s hands in the case of an
“imminent and seemingly irrevocable nuclear strike,” especially
given how long it might take to secure congressional approval.114
Blair also cautions that a unilateral bad decision remains
possible if a conflict lengthens or shifts after Congress grants
authority for nuclear launch.115 The legislation has also been
attacked by Republican Senator Deb Fischer of Nebraska, the
chairwoman of the Armed Services Committee Subcommittee
on Strategic Forces. Fischer stated the proposed legislation
“betrays a naïve and disturbed world view” since “Presidents
from both parties, including the Obama administration, have
rejected a no-first-use policy because it erodes deterrence,
undermines allied confidence in US security guarantees, and
risks emboldening potential adversaries.”116
A second avenue includes proposals that seek to bolster or
supplement aspects of the 25th Amendment. These proposals
include procedures that would require other officials to be
advised of a possible nuclear launch and provide approval.
Richard K. Betts117 and Matthew C. Waxman,118 in a joint paper
supporting these proposals, stated: “any presidential order to
launch nuclear weapons that is not in response to an enemy
nuclear attack should require the concurrence of the Secretary
of Defense and the Attorney General.”119 While recognizing that
this proposal may merely “[l]engthen[] the time in which an
irrational launch order could be held up,” Betts and Waxman
suggest it would “buy time for the most extreme solution”
of determining a president disabled pursuant to the 25th
Amendment.120
113 H.R. 921, 116th Cong. (2019).
114 Blair, supra note 82, at 10.
115 Id.
116 Ryan Browne, Warren introduces bill to stop US using nuclear weapons first,
CNN (Jan. 30, 2019, 7:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/30/
politics/warren-adam-smith-nuclear-weapons/index.html. President
Barack Obama had considered declaring a “no first use” policy for nuclear
weapons in the final year of his administration but was deterred by
opposition from Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense
Ash Carter. Ankit Panda, ‘No First Use’ and Nuclear Weapons, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (July 17, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/no-first-useand-nuclear-weapons.
117 Director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia
University and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
118 Liviu Librescu Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and an Adjunct
Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
119 Betts & Waxman, supra note 78, at 120; see also Kimball & Kingston, supra
note 80.
120 Betts & Waxman, supra note 78, at 125.
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Finally, another proposal would designate the next two
people in the presidential line of succession—ordinarily, the
vice president and speaker of the House—as the necessary
concurring officers.121 Proponents of this approach argue
that it has three important advantages: political legitimacy,
democratic input, and independence of the concurring
individuals. The assent requirement from both officers would
be applicable regardless of whether the action was proactive,
preemptive, or in response to an attack. The two officials could
veto the launch order if they determined the president to be
mentally unstable or otherwise unfit. The purpose would be to
provide a necessary safeguard regarding the order’s lawfulness
because there may not be sufficient time to activate the 25th
Amendment in these situations.122
As the repeated actions of presidents of both political parties
have demonstrated, the validity of the War Powers Resolution
remains highly contested, and compliance has been incredibly
inconsistent. Such volatility exemplifies the difficulty of
evaluating the practical impacts of implementing any contested
proposal for limiting unilateral presidential authority to initiate
a nuclear strike. The possibility remains that adherence to the
current policy will remain highly reliant on the ad hoc behavior
of military officers who will be forced to determine whether
a relayed presidential order is lawful. It is possible that the
informal adjudication of the conflict presented between a
presidential order and a congressional mandate will provide
the requisite delay to permit consideration of the incapacity of
the president and triggering Section 4 of the 25th Amendment.
It is also important to consider concerns raised by many of
the various proposals regarding implications for the deterrent
value of the nuclear defense system123 and the debate about
121 Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright & Steve Fetter, How to Limit Presidential
Authority to Order the use of Nuclear Weapons, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Jan. 23, 2018. See also Forrester, supra note 110, at 1641 (“[R]
equire the President to receive the concurrence of at least one of the
two [representatives of the House and Senate] in the President’s plan of
action”).
122 Gronlund et al., supra note 121.
123 See, e.g., Goldstein, Failure of Constitutional Controls over War Powers in the
Nuclear Age, supra note 101, at 1586 (“to adhere religiously to orthodox
principles of congressional war declaration would be to render the entire
nuclear defense deterrence system virtually worthless”); Authority to Order
the Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 87 (remarks of Peter Feaver) (“You
want to make sure that you don’t propose a legislative fix that undermines
the nuclear deterrent and, thus, compromises the effectiveness of why we
have nuclear weapons.”); id. (remarks of Gen. Kehler) (“it enhances our
deterrence to have some doubt in the mind of an adversary about under
what conditions we would use a nuclear weapon”).
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command and control itself.124 However, absent a constitutional
amendment, the respective postures of the executive and
legislative branches make implementation of the prior four
proposals unlikely.

Proposal 4: Utilize Congressional Budgetary Powers
to Mandate Closer Coordination with Defense
Department on Nuclear Arsenal
Congress should utilize its budgetary powers to ensure
increased consultation regarding nuclear arsenal plans. Given
Congress’ contested authority to legislatively preclude the use
of nuclear weapons or to mandate the assent of executive or
congressional officials, the power of the purse is the optimal
choice to ensure the implementation of desired checks and
balances. Congress should, therefore, compel the Department
of Defense to engage in frequent consultation with House
and Senate leadership about the nation’s nuclear arsenal
plans and require updates when there are any sudden or
unplanned changes in the United States’ nuclear footing. Such
consultation would further empower Congress to fund only
those purchases or that maintenance it considers integral to
national security and to force the attrition of those systems
or stockpiles it believes to not be in the nation’s best interest.
Congress could additionally mandate that the secretary of
defense inform executive branch national security leadership,
including the vice president and other principal officers of the
executive departments on the National Security Council, when
there is an unanticipated change in the nation’s nuclear footing.
Such notification could result in those officials evaluating the
initiation a Section 4 process under the 25th Amendment.
This proposal would ensure that Congress (1) plays the proper
role in outfitting and positioning nuclear weaponry and (2)
contributes to a potential consensus around the need to
activate Section 4. By avoiding the unresolved debate over the
president’s war powers, this proposal presents the best option
to provide immediate and meaningful protections against
errant launches.
124 See, e.g., Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 87
(remarks of Sen. Rubio) (“[T]his is an important conversation, but one we
should tread lightly on. Our allies who rely on U.S. defense assurances are
watching, and if we create doubt in their minds about the capability or the
willingness of the United States to live up to those commitments . . . it could
have repercussions that are significant . . . I also think our adversaries are
watching.”).

V. Conclusion
More than half-a-century ago, the framers of the 25th
Amendment made great strides in planning for the perils of
an unable president. Today’s policymakers should continue
to build on that legacy by working to ensure that it is possible
to effectively invoke the amendment when needed and that
there are additional checks placed on the president’s nuclear
authorities for scenarios where invocation of the amendment
is not practical.
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